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WIGS AND HAIR EXTENSIONS MARKET
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ABSTRACT
This Essay analyzes expressive boycotts in the market for wigs and hair
extensions, where consumers are primarily African Americans and producers
are almost uniformly Korean Americans. This type of ethnically segmented and
misaligned (“ESM”) market raises unique doctrinal and theoretical questions.
Under antitrust caselaw, the treatment of a campaign to divert business from
Korean American–owned to African American–owned hair stores is uncertain
because of the campaign’s mixed social and economic motives. Delving into the
theoretical implications of this ESM market can help steer the doctrine
appropriately. Along the way, such an exercise illuminates the nuances of racial
solidarity and market power among consumers, as well as the inequality
between consumers and producers.

*

Professor and Co-Director, Corporate Law Center, University of Cincinnati College of
Law. Fellow, Thurman Arnold Project, Yale School of Management. E-mail:
felix.chang@uc.edu. I am indebted to Rory Van Loo, Mitu Gulati, and Brishen Rogers for
their support and insightful comments. Thanks, too, to Dan Crane, Kate Judge, Manisha Padi,
and Ramsi Woodcock. This Essay benefitted greatly from the Boston University Law Review
Symposium on Law, Markets, and Distribution and Professor Gulati’s Identity, Law, &
Politics seminar. We thank Elise Ogden and the rest of the Boston University Law Review for
their careful editing.
∗∗ Class of 2023, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
∗∗∗ Class of 2023, University of Cincinnati College of Law.

101

102

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:ppp

INTRODUCTION
Boycotts, especially in furtherance of racial justice, are becoming better
organized and more visible. Since the killings of Michael Brown and Freddie
Gray, boycotts have hit the National Football League, 1 Goya Foods, 2 and
Georgia-based companies. 3 These expressive boycotts implicate both antitrust
and First Amendment questions because they are “political yet also
economically self-interested.” 4 However, most expressive boycotts have limited
effects on competition—boycotting consumers typically present no serious
alternatives to incumbent producers—so antitrust concerns should yield easily
to speech protections. 5
These truisms are upended in markets where producers hail from one ethnic
group while consumers hail from another. In such ethnically segmented and
misaligned (“ESM”) markets, 6 intragroup solidarity allows otherwise discrete

1 See John Breech, Kaepernick Petition Calling for NFL Boycott Is Gaining Steam, Has
SPORTS
(Aug.
9,
2017,
11:28
AM),
130k
Supporters,
CBS
https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/kaepernick-petition-calling-for-nfl-boycott-is-gainingsteam-has-130k-supporters/ [https://perma.cc/8SC9-6X4R] (describing popular petition on
Change.org to boycott NFL if Colin Kaepernick did not play 2017 season). There have also
been counterboycotts against the NFL for giving into social justice demands. See Jesse
Washington, The NFL Is Being Squeezed by Boycotts from Both Sides over Anthem Protests,
THE UNDEFEATED (Sept. 13, 2017), https://theundefeated.com/features/nfl-boycotts-fromboth-sides-over-anthem-protests/ [https://perma.cc/BAB4-H6TW].
2 Allyson Chiu, Goya’s CEO Said the U.S. Is “Truly Blessed” with President Trump.
Latinos
Are
Now
Boycotting,
WASH.
POST
(July
10,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/10/goya-boycott-trump/
(discussing
movement to boycott Goya Foods after CEO’s commendation of Donald Trump).
3 Chris Isidore, Georgia-Based Companies Face Boycott Calls over Voting Bill, CNN
(Apr. 1, 2021, 9:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/31/business/georgia-voting-lawprompts-calls-for-business-boycotts/index.html [https://perma.cc/9F3Y-YWJN] (discussing
boycotts of Georgia-based companies including Coca-Cola and Delta that “didn’t do enough
to defeat” new Georgia law suppressing minority voting).
4 Hillary Greene, Antitrust Censorship of Economic Protest, 59 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1039
(2010). Expressive boycotts are “a form of social campaign wherein purchasers express their
dissatisfaction by collectively refusing to buy.” Id.
5 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982). However, the balance
between antitrust and First Amendment is hardly settled. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial
Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (rejecting social considerations for boycott’s restraints
on trade). For a fuller discussion, see Section II.A. infra.
6 Felix B. Chang, Ethnically Segmented Markets: Korean-Owned Black Hair Stores, 97
IND. L.J. 479 (2022).
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producers or consumers to band together and fend off competition. 7 Cultural and
linguistic affinities facilitate coordination while enhancing market power.8
This Essay examines expressive boycotts in one of the most distinctive ESM
markets in the country: the $6 billion market for wigs and hair extensions for
African Americans. 9 Here manufacturing, wholesale, and retail are controlled
by Korean- and Korean American–owned firms, which rose to prominence
during the 1960s, when South Korea emerged as major exporter of wigs. 10
Through the decades, these firms maintained their dominance by collusive and
exclusionary schemes. For example, they formed trade groups that restricted the
import and distribution of South Korean wigs. 11 Their wholesalers refused to
sell products to African American–owned retailers, 12 while their retailers
refused to carry products created by African Americans. 13
The wigs and extensions market creates a peculiar strain of interracial
inequality, an inequality separating two racialized peoples of color: African
Americans and Asian Americans (or, more precisely, Koreans and Korean

7 The notion that a persecuted ethnic group withdraws into itself is well established in
sociology and ethnic studies. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Turner & Edna Bonacich, Toward a
Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities, 7 ETHNICITY 144, 154 (1980) (theorizing that
“middleman minorities” concentrate in middle rank entrepreneurial economic roles and this
increases intraethnic organization, hostility, and economic concentration).
8 Id. at 153.
9 Susan Adams, Long on Hair: The World’s First Venture-Backed Human-Hair-Extension
Company Wants To Be The Airbnb of Salons, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2019, 6:54 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2019/09/27/long-on-hair-the-worlds-first-venturebacked-human-hair-extension-company-wants-to-be-the-airbnb-ofsalons/?sh=31cb091873a3.
10 See Jason Petrulis, “A Country of Hair”: A Global Story of South Korean Wigs, Korean
American Entrepreneurs, African American Hairstyles, and Cold War Industrialization, 21
ENTER. & SOC. 368, 372 (2020).
11 See United States v. Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., No. 75-3069, 1976 WL 1219, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1976).
12 See, e.g., Emma Sapong, Roots of Tension: Race, Hair, Competition and Black Beauty
PUB.
RADIO
NEWS
(Apr.
25,
2017,
5:00
PM),
Stores,
MINN.
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/04/25/black-beauty-shops-korean-suppliers-roots-oftension-mn [https://perma.cc/EG7Y-DU7X] (describing Black hair salon owner’s experience
being denied Black hair products by Korean wholesalers); Why Do Koreans Own The Black
(Sept.
27,
2010),
Beauty
Supply
Business?,
MADAMENOIRE
https://madamenoire.com/104753/why-do-koreans-own-the-black-beauty-supply-business/
[https://perma.cc/AKY3-VF56] (noting Black entrepreneurs are often disenfranchised by
Korean hair product distributors who handpick to whom they will distribute products).
13 See
Aron
Ranen,
Black
Hair,
YOUTUBE
(May
19,
2006),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p96aaTSdrAE [https://perma.cc/2J82-VLRB] (exploring
Korean control of Black beauty supply industry, including refusal to carry hair products
manufactured by African Americans); see also GOOD HAIR (HBO Films 2009) (exploring
Black hair industry and relationship Black women have with their hair).
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Americans). To be sure, racial cartels recur throughout U.S. history. 14 White
labor unions have stonewalled the employment of Black and Chinese workers, 15
and White homeowners’ associations have adopted racially restrictive
covenants. 16 Similarly, and perhaps more innocuously, ethnic entrepreneurs and
merchant groups have utilized private systems of contract enforcement, dispute
resolution, and wholesale and distribution to exert control over parts of various
industries around the world. 17 Yet even against these backdrops, the wigs and
extensions market stands out. Here, one ethnic group dominates the production
and sale of goods utilized almost entirely by another race. Given the absence of
recourse against hair discrimination, 18 wigs and extensions are often an
indispensable good. 19 Demand is therefore inelastic, conferring market power to
producers. 20

14

Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45, 48 (2010).
See id. at 46-47; BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION,
AND THE MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA 40-43 (2018).
16 Roithmayr, supra note 14, at 52-53; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 6, 23 (1948);
Stephen L. Ross, Understanding Racial Segregation: What Is Known About the Effect of
Housing Discrimination, in NEIGHBORHOOD AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN
MODERN AMERICA, 288, 289 (Harriet B. Newburger et al. eds., 2011). See generally Jacob S.
Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Segregation in Post-Civil Rights America: Stalled Integration or
End of the Segregated Century?, 11 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 205 (2014)
(analyzing empirically continuing racial segregation and integration).
17 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Contract Governance in Small-World Networks: The Case
of the Maghribi Traders, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1009 (2019) (Maghribi Jewish merchants Islamic Mediterranean in the 11th century); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions
Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 383, 384 (2006) (Jewish diamond merchants in New York); Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (the diamond industry generally); CHINESE MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA,
CENTRAL ASIA AND EASTERN EUROPE (Felix Chang & Sunnie Rucker-Chang eds., 2012)
(Chinese merchants throughout history, especially post-Communism, in Russia, Central
Asia, and Eastern Europe).
18 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis
under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1093-94 (2010); D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair
(And Other Race-Based Characteristics) Got To Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355,
1370-75 (2008).
19 To avoid generalization, it is important to note that the preference for wigs and
extensions is not universal. Many African American women wear natural hair, or alternate
between natural hair and extensions. Sughnen Yongo-Okochi, More Black Women Are
PIECES
(Feb.
23,
2021),
Choosing
Natural
Hair,
PAVEMENT
https://pavementpieces.com/more-black-women-are-choosing-natural-hair/
[https://perma.cc/3ZXQ-WWPW].
20 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 105-06 (6th ed. 2020) (analyzing relationship between market power and
elasticity of demand).
15
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Understandably, this dominance by Korean American–owned firms stokes
consumer ire. Korean American–owned wig stores were destroyed during
protests in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 after prosecutors failed to charge Michael
Brown’s killer, and in Baltimore in 2015 after the funeral of Freddie Gray. 21 For
African American consumers, who often charge that Korean Americans have
monopolized the ethnic beauty products market, boycotts are a common tactic. 22
African Americans have organized boycotts of Korean American businesses for
decades, including most prominently after the killing of Latasha Harlins by a
Korean American convenience story owner in Los Angeles in 1991. 23
Today, however, boycotts in the wigs and extensions market pose unique
antitrust challenges for doctrinal and economic reasons. African American
insurgents are now gaining market share by relying on nontraditional sources
and distribution channels. Mayvenn, a Black-owned retailer that started in 2012
and has funding from venture capital powerhouse Andreessen Horowitz, sources
hair from Asia and sells either directly to consumers or through salons. 24
Indique, co-founded in 2007 by African American and Indian American
partners, sources from India and sells products through its proprietary salons. 25
These upstarts are providing consumers with viable coracial alternatives for the
first time in decades. Unlike the boycotts against the NFL or Georgia-based
businesses such as Delta, Coca-Cola and Home Depot, African Americans can
pivot to Black-owned alternatives that compete directly with the incumbents.26
Intraracial solidarity can steer consumer preferences toward Black-owned
firms. 27 Couched in doctrinal terms, economic self-interest predominates,
elevating the antitrust considerations. Arguably, for boycotts premised on
“buying Black,” expressive and economic functions are indistinguishable. 28

21

Petrulis, supra note 10, at 397.
See Alyssa Otis, Why Do Korean-American Owned Beauty Supply Stores Succeed in a
Business That Doesn’t Revolve Around Their Culture?, RAMPAGES (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://rampages.us/univmultimodal/ [https://perma.cc/Q663-VPU4] (“Korean-American
owned beauty supply store owners have dominated the Black hair industry for as long as
Black consumers have been boycotting it, since the mid-1960s.”).
23 See Seth Mydans, Korean Grocer Convicted in Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1991, at 6.
24 Adams, supra note 9; About Us, MAYVENN, https://shop.mayvenn.com/about-us
[https://perma.cc/FS7U-RJNL] (last visited Feb. 11, 2022).
25 See
Our
Company,
INDIQUE
VIRGIN
HAIR
EXTENSIONS,
https://www.indiquehair.com/pages/our-company [https://perma.cc/V47M-7UYX] (last
visited Feb. 11, 2022).
26 See Isidore, supra note 3.
27 See Mandy, 53 Black-Owned Hair Care Brands You Can Support, OFF. BLACK WALL.
ST. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://officialblackwallstreet.com/black-owned-haircare-beautyproducts/ [https://perma.cc/4SVH-PUD7].
28 Nonetheless, we must not lose sight of the long history of expropriation of African
American innovations and property by other racialized groups, particularly White people.
After desegregation, when the artificial barriers between White and African American
businesses were lifted, many Black-owned businesses crumbled. Reginald Stuart, Businesses
22
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Expressive boycotts by consumers in ESM markets challenge doctrinal
convention in several ways. While antitrust treatment of group boycotts has
evolved from per se illegality 29 to rule of reason, 30 current precedent on
expressive boycotts reflects more a schism than a spectrum regarding the degree
of First Amendment protection from antitrust scrutiny. 31 Antitrust deference
seems to turn on whether the classification of the speech at hand is either “purely
economically motivated or purely political.” 32 In the wigs and extensions
market, however, economic self-interest motivates boycotts at least as much as
political or social expression. 33 Further, intraracial solidarity renders market
power among African American buyers more likely. While lack of market power
is no defense to conspiracy, 34 courts have requested clarity on market power in
expressive boycott cases. 35 A determination of market power, then, invites
sociological debates on the durability of intraracial bonds.
This Essay examines a set of theoretical questions in the wigs and extensions
market, with a view toward reconciling the doctrinal split and extrapolating
broader lessons for racial boycotts. The theoretical inquiries will focus on the
market power of African American consumers, compared against the market
power of Korean American–owned retailers. Part I of the Essay introduces the
wigs and extensions market as the setting for racial boycotts. Part II briefly
surveys the doctrinal landscape on expressive boycotts. Part III dives into the
unique theoretical challenges posed by boycotts in this market.
I.

BOYCOTTS IN THE WIGS AND EXTENSIONS MARKET

ESM markets are a peculiar type of ethnically segmented market where
consumers are drawn from one ethnic or racial group while producers are drawn
from another. 36 In most markets segmented by race or ethnicity, the market has
Owned By Blacks Still Fighting An Uphill Battle, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1981, at A1. In their
place stood large White-owned companies that sold to African Americans at a substantial
markup. Id. Manufacturers of ethnic beauty supplies have followed the same trajectory. Brian
S. Feldman, The Decline of Black Business, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar. 19, 2017),
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2017/03/19/the-decline-of-black-business/
[https://perma.cc/J68W-G7EJ].
29 See, e.g., E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 607
(1914); Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
30 See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 134 (1998). For analysis on this
doctrine’s application to an ethnically segmented market similar to the one at hand, see Barak
D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and
Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 336-46 (2009).
31 See Richman, supra note 30 (describing lack of definitive authority on subject of legality
of expressive boycotts).
32 Greene, supra note 4, at 1057.
33 See id.
34 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
35 See Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
36 Chang, supra note 6, at 482.
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divided in response to the preferences or patterns of consumers or producers.
For instance, White homeowners (producers) might utilize homeowners’
associations or restrictive covenants to divide a neighborhood’s housing stock
along racial lines. 37 In a diverse city, the market for groceries and food products
might be segmented along the tastes of its ethnic communities (consumers). 38
Finally, a nation’s labor market (producers) might segment along racial lines,
with each segment attaining different incomes. 39 Typically, if one side of a
market is ethnically segmented, the other side will either be ethnically
heterogenous or share the same ethnicities as the first side (i.e., coethnic). 40 In
the homeowners and labor market examples, the consumers (homebuyers and
employers) are a racially mixed bunch. 41 In the ethnic foods example, producers
tend to be coethnic with their consumers. 42
In ESM markets, however, producers belong to one ethnic or racial group,
while consumers belong to another. Producers and consumers are both ethnically
homogenous and ethnically misaligned. 43
One of the most notable ESM markets in the U.S. is the market for wigs and
hair extensions, where most consumers are African American and most
producers are Korean American. 44 This roughly $6 billion market has been
dominated since the 1970s by Korean- and Korean American–owned firms. 45
To an extent, Korean dominance can be explained by a confluence of historical
and structural factors, including Cold War priorities that elevated South Korea
as a supplier of wigs. 46 Since the 1960s, de-industrialization has also hollowed
out urban centers, depressing rents and lowering the entry barrier for brick-andmortar ethnic beauty supply stores. 47 Simultaneously, however, African
American entrepreneurs are often unable to secure the seed financing to start
37 See Roithmayr, supra note 14, at 52.
See Ferzana Havewala, The Dynamics Between the Food Environment and Residential
Segregation: An Analysis of Metropolitan Areas, 103 FOOD POL’Y 102015, 102015 (2021).
39 See Scott Cummings, White Ethnics, Racial Prejudice, and Labor Market Segmentation,
85 AM. J. SOCIO. 938, 939 (1980).
40 For an example of coethnic alignment between buyers and sellers, see Amanda Lea Robinson, Internal Borders: Ethnic-Based Market Segmentation in Malawi, 87 WORLD DEV.
371 (2016) (preference for coethnic sales and purchases in ethnically diverse Malawi, due in
part to interethnic mistrust). As for ethnically segmented producers paired with ethnically
heterogenous consumers, examples abound in ethnic restaurants.
41 Roithmayr, supra note 14, at 52.
42 Havewala, supra note 38, at 102016.
43 Chang, supra note 6, at 482.
44 Black Impact: Consumer Categories Where African Americans Move Markets, NIELSEN
(Feb.
15,
2018),
https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2018/black-impactconsumer-categories-where-african-americans-move-markets/
[https://perma.cc/YA6DZQYL]; Sapong, supra note 12.
45 See Adams, supra note 9; Petrulis, supra note 10, at 369.
46 See Petrulis, supra note 10, at 373.
47 See IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN LOS
ANGELES 1965-1982, 17 (1988).
38
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businesses in their communities; compared with their Korean American
counterparts, African Americans enjoy far less support from banking and small
business finance agencies. 48
Yet Korean American–owned firms actively worked to secure and maintain
market dominance. In 1975, the Department of Justice sued the Korean Hair
Goods Association of America, Inc., an import association in New York, for
setting prices on wigs and for excluding importers and distributors. 49 Since that
time, African American consumers and competitors have insisted that Korean
Americans monopolize the market, shut out Black retailers, and refuse to
distribute products made by African Americans. 50
Apart from alleging antitrust violations, how can African American
consumers retain wealth in Black communities? 51 As consumers in an ESM
market, African Americans themselves wield market power. They can organize
boycotts against Korean American wholesalers and retailers to direct patronage
to African American competitors. More so than in decades, African American
consumers now have viable coethnic alternatives to Korean-owned hair stores,
due to advances in social media, distribution networks, and supply chains.
Mayvenn, for example, is a well-capitalized upstart funded by powerhouse VCs
and Black celebrities. 52 The company has thrived by sourcing hair from China
and distributing products via Black stylists. 53 Indique sources hair from India
and has grown a network of salons across the country. 54 On a smaller scale,
numerous Black-owned alternatives have emerged as well, and they have
experimented with both online and traditional brick-and-mortar distribution
channels. 55
Today, with the explosion of Black alternatives, consumer boycotts are hardly
farfetched. African Americans have certainly called for boycotts of Korean
American–owned businesses in Black communities in the past, beyond just hair
48

See Tamara K. Nopper, Revisiting “Black-Korean Conflict” and the “Myth of Special
Assistance”: Korean Banks, US Government Agencies, and the Capitalization of Korean
Immigrant Small Business in the United States, 1 KALFOU: J. COMPAR. & RELATIONAL ETHNIC
STUD. 59, 81 (2014).
49 See United States v. Korean Hair Goods Assoc. of Am., Inc., 40 Fed. Reg. 57,696 (Dep’t
of Just. Dec. 3, 1975) (notice).
50 See, e.g., GOOD HAIR, supra note 13; Ranen, supra note; Dr. Edward Tony Lloneau,
How and Why Korean Owned Beauty Supply Stores Dominate in the Afro Community, LIQUID
GOLD BLOG
(Sept.
8,
2013)
http://www.liquidgoldbonding.com/blog/?p=126
[https://perma.cc/VL2T-46Y8].
51 For an example of a groundbreaking study of how ethnic communities managed to
“vertically integrate” to keep wealth with coethnic businesses, see Kenneth L. Wilson & W.
Allen Martin, Ethnic Enclaves: A Comparison of the Cuban and Black Economies in Miami,
88 AM. J. SOCIO. 135, 137 (1982).
52 See supra note 24.
53 See supra note 24.
54 See supra note 25.
55 See Sapong, supra note 12.
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stores. 56 In communities where businesses have often been owned by immigrant
entrepreneurs, interracial tensions augment the natural frictions between buyers
and sellers. 57 Yet the wigs and extensions market is almost sui generis. Here, the
racial and ethnic uniformity of both producers and consumers brings their racial
misalignment into sharper relief, exacerbating tensions. 58 In recent episodes
where community frustrations have erupted into action, particularly after
episodes of police violence, African Americans have targeted ethnic beauty
supply stores. 59
The emergence of viable alternatives like Mayvenn, Indique, and smaller
upstarts provides alternatives for individual consumers who may be frustrated
that products utilized almost exclusively by African Americans are sold almost
exclusively by Korean Americans. Social media can facilitate connections with
likeminded, coethnic consumers. If African American consumers band together
to act in concert, they transform their individual preferences into group boycotts.
Calls for boycotts of Korean American–owned Black hair stores recur regularly
enough to seriously challenge Korean American incumbents. 60
In the wigs and extensions market, however, a consumer boycott is not merely
expressive—it can enrich the very community from which the boycott emanates.
Economic benefit is central to a boycott; here, the essence of any “buy Black”
56 CLAIRE JEAN KIM, BITTER FRUIT: THE POLITICS OF BLACK-KOREAN CONFLICT IN NEW
YORK CITY 109-55 (2000); M.A. Farber, Black-Korean Who-Pushed-Whom Festers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1990, at B1.
57 Farber, supra note 42 (describing the cycle of tension be-tween Korean business owners
and Black patrons over the course of 1990).
58 Other businesses in Black and Brown communities, such as convenience stores and
liquor stores, might be owned by a variety of different immigrant groups. Sari Pekkala Kerr
& William Kerr, Immigrant Entrepreneurship in America: Evidence From the Survey of
Business Owners 2007 & 2012, 49 RSCH. POL’Y 103918, 103920. Yet Black hair stores have
been cornered by Korean Americans.
59 See Petrulis, supra note 10, at 397; Michael Corkery, A Korean Store Owner. A Black
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2020),
Employee.
A
Tense
Neighborhood,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/business/beauty-store-race-protests.html.
60 For instance, search for the terms “boycott,” “Korean,” “Black,” and “hair” together on
Twitter.
TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/search?q=boycott%20Korean%20black%20hair&src=typed_query
[https://perma.cc/785N-QVMD]. For an older example, see ionehiphopwiredstaff, Activist
Devin Robinson Calls For Boycott Of Non-Black Owned Beauty Supply Stores,
HIPHOPWIRED
(Nov.
18,
2009),
https://hiphopwired.com/16106/16106/
[https://perma.cc/UV8N-6TBV]. In response to the episode at a Charlotte, North Carolina hair
store, some African American consumers in Chicago rallied together to boycott local Asianowned businesses within one week. See Spitting Knowledge for Mind Elevation, Blacks In
Chicago Boycott Asian Owned Businesses, YouTube, Mar. 20, 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UTjMA0EvKg [https://perma.cc/8RX8-UWJE]; Nigel
Roberts, Asian-Owned Beauty Supply Store Faces Boycott After Owner Attacks Black
Customer, NEWSONE (Mar. 13, 2017), https://newsone.com/3693379/charlotte-northcarolina-store-owner-chokes-black-customer-in-viral-video/ [https://perma.cc/BCF2-4G5S].
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campaign is to redirect money from incumbents to coethnic insurgents. 61 As the
next Section illustrates, these boycotts confound antitrust doctrine because the
economic goals are at least as strong as the expressive functions.
II.

ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF RACIALLY COLLUSIVE BOYCOTTS

This Section summarizes the antitrust considerations of racially collusive
boycotts and the novel ways in which boycotts in the hair and extensions market
challenge existing doctrine. The Section canvasses the doctrinal splits on group
boycotts. For ease of theoretical explorations, the Section positions boycotts in
hypotheticals where their legitimacy is most clearly challenged.
A.

Expressive Boycotts

Antitrust deference toward First Amendment considerations in expressive
boycotts falls along a continuum that depends on the centrality of economic
motivations for a boycott. The more economic considerations drive a boycott,
the likelier the boycott will be condemned under antitrust caselaw.62 However,
courts have had a difficult time articulating sliding scale for the predominance
of economic motivations. Instead, courts appear to characterize boycotts as
either purely economic or purely political. 63
The two classic cases on expressive boycotts reflect this schism. In NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 64 political considerations prevailed, and the
boycotters enjoyed First Amendment protections. 65 There, the NAACP and
African American residents of Claiborne County, Mississippi, organized a
boycott of white merchants in 1966 after their demands for racial equity went
unanswered by the local government. 66 Seventeen White merchants brought
claims against two corporations and over 100 individuals to recover losses from
the boycott and enjoin future boycotting activity. 67
The Supreme Court found that the boycotts were protected by the First
Amendment right to political expression. 68 Claiborne residents had been
pushing the Mississippi government to desegregate schools, pursue public
residential improvements in Black areas, and end verbal abuse perpetrated by
police officers. 69 In upholding the legitimacy of the residents’ actions, the Court
61

See 53 Black-Owned Hair Care Brands You Can Support, supra note 27; Lara Adekola,
6 Black-Owned Wig and Extension Brands You Need to Know, BYRDIE (Jan. 4, 2022),
https://www.byrdie.com/black-owned-wig-and-extension-brands-5082848
[https://perma.cc/U52W-3ZA7].
62 See Greene, supra note 4, at 1048-54.
63 Id. at 1057.
64 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
65 Id. at 943.
66 Id. at 889.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 912.
69 Id. at 899.
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characterized the boycotters’ motivations as political and noneconomic, 70
despite some evidence that at least one prominent organizer stood to benefit
financially when business was diverted from Claiborne County. 71
At the other end of the spectrum, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass’n 72 rejected the social justifications advanced by a group of lawyers
defending a boycott against the District of Columbia. 73 In 1983, that group of
attorneys, the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (“SCTLA”), staged a
strike to protest the low fees paid to private attorneys appointed under the
Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) to represent indigent clients. 74 In response, the
FTC filed a complaint alleging “a conspiracy to fix prices and to conduct a
boycott” as well as “unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.” 75
With the SCTLA invoking Claiborne Hardware, the Supreme Court took
great pains to characterize the boycott as price fixing. 76 In fact, the Court
distinguished the boycotters in Claiborne Hardware as seeking “no special
advantage for themselves,” “only the equal respect and equal treatment to which
they were constitutionally entitled” rather than “destroy[ing] legitimate
competition.” 77 In this case, the CJA boycott was the means by which attorneys
sought to obtain favorable legislation and had anticompetitive effects whether
or not legislation was enacted. 78 The Supreme Court concluded that a boycott is
not expressive and does not warrant protection under the First Amendment when
the conspiracy explicitly is for economic gain. 79 Further, the Court affirmed that
boycotters need not achieve a monopoly or high degree of market power to
warrant condemnation under antitrust laws. 80
The remaining caselaw on expressive boycotts, while sparse, has fallen into
either the Claiborne Hardware or the Superior Court Trial Lawyers camp. More
aptly put, these two cases are proxies for whether a court finds that economic or
noneconomic goals predominate. In one of the more prominent cases, Missouri
v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 81 the National Organization for
Women (“NOW”) organized a convention boycott of states that had not ratified
the Equal Rights Amendment. 82 The boycott, which the Eighth Circuit

70

See id. at 913.
For a concise summary, see Greene, supra note 4, at 1061-63.
72 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
73 Id. at 432.
74 Id. at 416.
75 Id. at 418-19.
76 See id. at 424, 428
77 Id. at 426-27.
78 Id. at 424.
79 Id. at 431-32.
80 Id. at 433-35.
81 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
82 Id. at 1302-03.
71
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characterized as “politically motivated but economically tooled,” was
challenged by the state of Missouri on antitrust grounds. 83 The court held that
the Sherman Act did not cover NOW’s boycott and, moreover, that the boycott
was “privileged on the basis of the First Amendment right to petition.” 84 This
privilege refers to the Noerr-Pennington line of cases conferring antitrust
immunity on government petitioning activity that might affect competition. 85 In
elevating First Amendment concerns over antitrust policy, Noerr-Pennington set
the foundation for prioritizing speech considerations in boycotts for social and
political purposes.
Boycotts in the wigs and extensions market challenge this doctrinal split.
Clearly, any “buying Black” campaign would be spurred by noneconomic goals
such as social cohesion and racial pride. In our time, the national reckoning over
racial justice has helped unify Black communities while highlighting the need
for representation across society and the economy. 86 Yet economic
considerations would be at least as integral as social considerations to boycotts
in this market. The very point of such boycotts would be to divert proceeds to
coethnic communities who stand to benefit from the demise of Korean
American–owned hair stores.
Based on antitrust precedent, it seems indeterminate on how a boycott in this
market would fare if challenged by Korean American businesses. So far, courts
have determined the outcome of antitrust challenges by classifying a boycott as
either political or economic; even if that distinction seems arbitrary, it has been
defensible at least because boycotters under the facts did not present viable
alternatives. 87 Here, however, a number of African American–owned
83

Id.
Id. at 1319. Notably, a vigorous dissent challenged the majority’s characterization of the
boycott as noneconomic and countered that whatever its technical characterization, the
anticompetitive effects were severe. Id. at 1322-23 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
85 See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961);
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); see also Marina Lao,
Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 1002
(2003) (discussing constitutional foundation for Noerr doctrine privileges that protect collective action to influence government action). The dissent in Missouri v. National Organization
for Women, Inc. argued that the actions at hand were different than what Noerr would insulate,
stating that NOW orchestrated a boycott of “a specific, identifiable segment of a highly
competitive industry.” 620 F.2d at 1323-24.
86 See Jenna Wortham, A ‘Glorious Poetic Rage:’ This Time is Different. Here’s Why, N.Y
TIMES (June 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/sunday-review/black-livesmatter-protests-floyd.html; see also Alan S. Gutterman, Taking a Stand on Racial Justice
and Equality, AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/11/racial-justice/ [https://perma.cc/P3F8-YFZ2] (emphasizing goals for business leaders to adopt practices that better represent diversity within their
company to address systemic racism in economy).
87 See Nat’l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d at 1315 n.16 (characterizing boycott by NOW as
“noncommercial and non-economic” but further grounding ruling in “the right to use political
activities to petition the government” under Noerr); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
84
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alternatives now exist, spanning from small Internet retailers to rapidly growing
and established businesses like Mayvenn and Indique. 88
B.

Collusive Versus Exclusionary Group Boycotts

Another split in antitrust caselaw separates collusive from exclusionary group
boycotts. Sometimes known as “concerted refusals to deal,” group boycotts can
garner collusive effects (e.g., fixing output or prices) or exclusionary effects
(e.g., denying rivals access to a facility, supplier, or market). 89 Collusive group
boycotts are much more likely to violate antitrust laws than exclusionary group
boycotts. 90 This reflects the greater scrutiny that antitrust places on horizontal
schemes, such as price fixing, than on vertical schemes, such as refusals to
deal. 91
As “a type of antitrust harm rather than a substantive violation,” 92 boycotts
are often secondary to an analysis of competitive effects. Historically, if a
boycott flowed from—or facilitated—price or output fixing, the conduct would
more likely be condemned as per se illegal. 93 Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass’n is but the latest example. 94 In a much older case, Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 95 retail lumber detailers collectively
refused to buy from wholesalers who also dabbled in the retail market. 96 The
Supreme Court affirmed the finding that this blacklist violated the Sherman Act.

U.S. 886, 915 (1982) (emphasizing “nonviolent elements” of boycotters’ actions); FTC v.
Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (“[S]ocial justifications proffered for respondents’ restraint of trade thus do not make it any less unlawful.”); see also Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 507 n.10 (1988) (“It is admittedly difficult
to draw the precise lines separating anticompetitive political activity that is immunized despite
its commercial impact from anticompetitive commercial activity that is unprotected despite
its political impact . . . .”).
88 See supra notes 24-25.
89 See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D.
WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION
POLICY 166, 600-10 (3d ed. 2017).
90 Id. at 166, 601.
91 But see Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 527, 555, 589 (2012).
92 HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 238. As Professor Hovenkamp elaborates, “[i]n most
antitrust litigation involving refusals to deal the refusal itself is not the violation. Many
antitrust complaints brought by the victims of refusals to deal allege that the defendants were
involved in illegal monopolization, tying, price fixing, resale price maintenance or vertical
nonprice restraints, or an illegal merger.” Id.
93 Id. at 239.
94 See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430-32 (1990) (suggesting
that even if boycott were “uniquely expressive,” per se treatment would still be warranted).
95 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
96 Id. at 606.
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Subsequently, in Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 97 Inc., the Court placed group
boycotts into the per se illegal category of actions violating antitrust law. 98 In
Klor’s, an electronics retailer was alleged to have conspired with manufacturers
and distributors to boycott a competitor of the retailer. 99 The Court deemed this
scheme anticompetitive (“interfer[ing] with the natural flow of interstate
commerce”) and monopolistic (“[having] a monopolistic tendency”). 100
Exclusionary group boycotts, on the other hand, require more nuanced
analysis—for instance, whether the defendants collectively wielded market
power and whether their actions enhanced efficiency. 101 These were among the
inquiries in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationary & Printing
Co., 102 where a purchasing cooperative of office supply retailers expelled Pacific
Stationary & Printing, a member that had functioned as both a wholesaler and a
retailer. 103 Pacific sued the cooperative for enacting a group boycott in violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 104 but the Court declined to extend the per se
line of cases to this setting. 105 The evaluation of this breadth of factors
anticipates the tortuous analysis of more recent exclusion cases. 106 It also
emphatically marks the shift in antitrust law’s treatment of concerted refusals to
deal from per se illegality to rule of reason.107
In truth, the facts in several foundational group boycott cases might be more
appropriately classified as exclusionary than collusive. 108 Hence, the evolution
from per se illegality to rule of reason in these cases reflects two possibilities:
either courts adopted the nuanced rule of reason analysis over time for all group
boycotts, or they did so only for exclusionary group boycotts. We believe that
precedent suggests the latter possibility. Given the forceful defense of the per se
approach in Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 109 as well as the scrutiny over

97

359 U.S. 207 (1959).
98 See id. at 212. (“Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category.”).
99 Id. at 209.
100 Id. at 213.
101 See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 294 (1985)
102 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
103 Id. at 287.
104 Id. at 288.
105 See id. at 296.
106 See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2277 (2018).
107 See, e.g., NYMNX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1998).
108 See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 89, at 603, 605-07 (summarizing alternate views of
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n and Klor’s).
109 See 493 U.S. 411, 430-35 (1990) ("A rule that requires courts to apply the antitrust laws
‘prudently and with sensitivity’ whenever an economic boycott has an ‘expressive
component’ would create a gaping hole in the fabric of those laws.”).
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concerted action among competitors, 110 collusive group boycotts likely merit per
se treatment. 111 Secondarily, courts need not delve into market power analysis
if collusion or conspiracy is established. 112
To be sure, the sample size of expressive boycott cases remains small, so it is
difficult to extrapolate firm rules. 113 How the distinctions between purely
economic and purely political boycotts intersect with the distinctions between
collusive and exclusionary group boycotts remains uncertain. For ease of
analysis, however, let us assume that a concerted refusal of African American
consumers to purchase wigs and extensions from Korean American–owned
firms qualifies as collusive, horizontal behavior. Such a boycott would certainly
implicate exclusionary behavior—for instance, walling off Korean American
incumbents from Black purchasing power. But we can set that aside to focus on
the conceptually clearer instances of African American buyers collectively
deciding to forego convenience and perhaps lower prices in a boycott of Korean
American retailers. Such a boycott would certainly fix the output of wigs and
hair extensions; it would ultimately drive down sales by Korean American–
owned incumbents and drive up sales by African American competitors.
III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The treatment of a collusive group boycott by African American consumers
of Korean American–owned retailers would be uncertain under antitrust
precedent. This Part explores several theoretical implications of such a boycott.
One goal of this discussion is to elucidate where the law should go. Another goal
is to highlight the questions of inequality and interracial relations raised by this
peculiar ESM market.
A.

Would Racial Solidarity Stave Off Boycott Cheating?

The viability of a boycott depends closely on the ability of consumers to
maintain cohesion. Once a boycott is called, consumers must not deviate;

110

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, § 5.1(b) (discussing antitrust law’s particular scrutiny
towards joint and concerted activity as opposed to unilateral conduct).
111 See also Greene, supra note 4, at 1065-67, 1094 (suggesting expressive boycotts are
sometimes analyzed under per se approach); Richman, supra note 30, at 341-46
(distinguishing when group boycotts might be analyzed under per se versus rule of reason).
112 See Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 436 (“Conspirators need not achieve
the dimensions of a monopoly, or even a degree of market power any greater than that already
disclosed by this record, to warrant condemnation under the antitrust laws.”). One of the
Court’s holdings in Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n was to overturn the appeals court’s
requirement that the FTC prove the boycotters held market power. See id. at 429-30.
113 See Greene, supra note 4, at 1068 (bemoaning lack of cases explicitly addressing intersection of First Amendment and antitrust law).
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otherwise, the boycott falls apart. 114 Consumer boycotts are difficult to maintain.
Despite public organization, they hinge on private discipline. 115 Consumers
predisposed to not participate in a given boycott are prone to rationalizing their
choices by second-guessing the campaign’s efficacy. 116
Thus, as with cartels and other horizontal conspiracies, boycotts must contend
with the incentive to cheat. Every member of a cartel faces the temptation to
defy cartel rules by secretly selling products. 117 A classic challenge in a cartel,
then, is to enforce the rules of an illegal scheme. 118 In boycotts, defection takes
the form of consumers surreptitiously buying from boycotted sellers. 119
For an African American group boycott of Korean American–owned hair
stores, the temptation to cheat may be strong: incumbent hair stores may be
cheaper or closer, or they may offer a greater variety of products (whose quality
can be assessed by touch) than insurgents. Additionally, African American–
owned challengers currently utilize distribution chains (e.g., online, through
stylists, and in limited physical locations) that are less immediate and less
accessible than brick-and-mortar hair stores. 120 Given the large and unwieldy
class of hypothetical boycotters in the wigs and extensions market, some
individual defections are inevitable and could quickly snowball to threaten an
entire campaign.
Still, a boycott in furtherance of racial solidarity might be different. Fueled
by perceptions of racial justice rather than (or as much as) desires for economic
gain, these boycotts could draw strength from the very factor that renders them
protean under antitrust: social and political (i.e., noneconomic) goals. According
to the scholarly literature on consumer boycotts and social protests, African
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See Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitive Realities, and Antitrust Policy, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2010) (noting
that boycotts can be “easily disrupted” by buyer defections).
115 See Monroe Friedman, Consumer Boycotts in the United States, 1970-1980:
Contemporary Events in Historical Perspective, 19 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 96, 116 (1985)
(noting that “[t]oo many demands on shoppers to change their buying habits, especially if
these demands are conflicting and controversial, might well lead to a lessening of consumer
cooperation and involvement”).
116 Stefan Hoffmann, Are Boycott Motives Rationalizations?, 12 J. CONSUMER BEHAV.
214, 219 (2013).
117 HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at 161-64; see also George J. Stigler, A Theory of
Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964) (“The literature of collusive agreements, ranging
from the pools of the 1880’s to the electrical conspiracies of recent times, is replete with
instances of the collapse of conspiracies because of ‘secret’ price-cutting.”).
118 For cartel pitfalls and strategies, see Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What
Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 67-75 (2006).
119 See Carstensen, supra note 113, at 35-36.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
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Americans are more likely than other races to stage boycotts. 121 This may be due
to the high degree of marginalization of African Americans by society. 122
Under theories of sociology, Black solidarity in the wigs and extensions
market may also be more likely because an ethnic community withdraws into
itself when under assault. 123 In this era, we are grappling with racial justice. As
a social movement, Black Lives Matter underscores the need for, but also the
complexity of, “contestation and solidarity” to advance racial justice. 124 This
awareness catalyzes Black solidarity generally and likely also in the wigs and
extensions market specifically, where interracial antagonism is heightened
because consumers and producers are racially homogenous but misaligned. 125
In African American communities, daily transactions with small business
owners, often immigrants, have been fraught with tension. This is true in hair
stores and other businesses, 126 and it has been true for decades. 127 At times,
producer-consumer frictions in these markets have fomented a more generalized
Asian-Black antagonism. 128 Even if the media has played up these

121

See MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE
MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 90 (1999); Darren E. Sherkat & T. Jean Blocker, The Political
Development of Sixties’ Activists: Identifying the Influence of Class, Gender, and
Socialization on Protest Participation, 72 SOC. FORCES 821, 836 (1994).
122 See Naomi A. Gardberg & William Newburry, Who Boycotts Whom? Marginalization,
Company Knowledge, and Strategic Issues, 52 BUS. & SOC’Y 318, 326, 343 (2009).
123 See Turner & Bonacich, supra note 7, at 154.
124 Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 414
(2018).
125 See supra note 44-48.
126 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 60 (recounting Black protest and boycott of minorityowned beauty store after owner choked Black customer); ionehiphopwiredstaff, supra note
60 (highlighting Professor Devin Robinson’s call for boycott after he was thrown out of
beauty supply store by Korean owner).
127 See Kyeyoung Park, Use and Abuse of Race and Culture: Black-Korean Tension in
America, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD: CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS 60, 62 (Kwang
Chung Kim ed., 1999) (focusing on conflicts between Black residents and Korean American
residents in South Central Los Angeles and discussing racial, cultural, and economic factors).
128 See Black Americans to Boycott Asian American Businesses Beginning August 1, 2021,
THYBLACKMAN.COM (July 18, 2021), https://thyblackman.com/2021/07/18/black-americansto-boycott-asian-american-businesses-beginning-august-1-2021/
[https://perma.cc/U247P29Q] (calling for boycott of Asian-owned businesses in part because of African Americans
being blamed for anti-Asian violence). One of the most unfortunate incidents in recent years
was the trial, protests, and counterprotests after Peter Liang, a Chinese American police
officer, killed an unarmed Black man, Akai Gurley. Erin Trahan, Documentary ‘Down a Dark
Stairwell’ Examines Divergent Responses to Racism in Policing, WBUR (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2021/02/04/documentary-down-a-dark-stairwell
[https://perma.cc/5Z6U-QBED] (reviewing documentary by Ursula Liang (no relation)
recounting violence, protests, and negotiations of minority myths and white supremacy).
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antagonisms, 129 they remain etched in the historical memories of both Korean
American and African American communities. 130
While historical and contemporary factors might have forged racial solidarity
among African American consumers, their unity is also undermined by the
dynamism of racial formation. So many factors influence racial and ethnic
formation that race should not be presumed to be static or homogenous. 131 This
heterogeneity of consumers bears out in studies of boycotts. For example, some
scholars have found that members of marginalized groups are more likely to
boycott, especially those who are economically upwardly mobile. 132 By
contrast, less affluent and upwardly mobile consumers may be less willing to
forego convenience, price, and choice to sustain a boycott. 133 The value of
intraracial solidarity is certainly ripe for future study. An empirical project might
quantify this value, for instance, by measuring the price points and other
conditions at which African American consumers switch to and from
coracial retailers. Even outside the boycott hypothetical, African Americans
vary greatly in their beauty preferences. Natural has been the style of
choice for Black consumers for decades.134 Despite society’s premium on
straight hair,135 African American consumers should not be presumed to
always favor the same. Accordingly, the intraracial solidarity in this
market becomes vastly more complicated, as does demand elasticity.

129 NADIA Y. KIM, IMPERIAL CITIZENS: KOREANS AND RACE FROM SEOUL TO LA 73 (2008)
(accusing mainstream American media of stoking Black-Korean conflict during 1992 Los
Angeles riots by “continuously airing footage of the Korean merchant, Soon Ja Du, shooting
Black teenager LaTasha Harlins, and of airing scenes of Black animosity towards Koreans”).

130

See id. at 128-34.

131

See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1013 (3d ed., 2015) (summarizing book’s exploration of racial formation through paradigms of
ethnicity, class, and nation)v.
132 See Gardberg & Newburry, supra note 122, 327-28, 350 (hypothesizing and concluding
that “a likely boycotter may be someone who has socially marginal roots but is economically
upwardly mobile).
133 See id. Slightly further afield, these findings turn on its head the notion from
immigration theory that migration is driven by relative deprivation, the sense that one is less
well off than one’s immediate neighbors. Here, the variation is that upward mobility may
heighten the sensitivity of some boycotters to their marginalization at the hands of boycotted
businesses.
134 See Natural Hair Movement Drives Sales of Styling Products in US Black Haircare
Market, MINTEL (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.mintel.com/press-centre/beauty-and-personalcare/natural-hair-movement-drives-sales-of-styling-products-in-us-black-haircare-market
[https://perma.cc/AA77-U9WW]; AYANA D. BYRD & LORI L. THARPS, HAIR STORY:
UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF BLACK HAIR IN AMERICA 54-59, 67-68, 169-70 (2001).
135 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 18, at 1093; Greene, supra note 18.
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What Does Consumer Market Power Look Like?

Closely related to intraracial solidarity is the issue of market power. Although
market power analysis might not be necessary in the easy cases of collusive
group boycotts, it clarifies the propensity for anticompetitive effects. In the wigs
and extensions market, market power implicates unique questions. Market
power is usually measured at the firm level, and the monopsony context
generally features one large buyer (usually a reseller or an employer) dealing
with numerous small sellers (usually a wholesaler, manufacturer, or labor
force). 136 Here, however, we are evaluating the collective market power of
millions of individual, atomistic consumers, all with distinct preferences. 137
What binds these consumers is race. Can it be said that race constitutes market
power? Is race cohesive enough as a force to overcome the impulse to defect
from a consumer boycott?
Even if the answers to the above questions are yes, measuring market power
is hardly straightforward. In a boycott setting, buyer power would be the ability
“to depress the price [the buyer] pays a supplier or obtain more favorable
nonprice terms.” 138 While a racial boycott in the wigs and extensions market is
not geared to lowering the prices of Korean American incumbents, this
definition is broad enough to encompass nonprice terms. Of course, given
antitrust’s disregard of noneconomic concerns, “nonprice concessions” 139 might
refer to economic advantages, rather a preference to steer business to coracial
producers.
Either way, from the standpoint of anticompetitive effects, African American
consumers certainly have the propensity to alter output and altogether exclude
Korean American–owned retailers. These anticompetitive effects would
constitute direct evidence of market power. 140 As for indirect evidence, wading
through product and geographic market definitions and then calculating market

136 See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 297, 297-98 (1991); Hiba Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 381, 383 (2020).
137 Further inverting conventional notions of monopsony, these millions of buyers are
transacting with a smaller number of hair stores, probably in the tens of thousands. See
MadameNoire, supra note 11 (estimating number of Korean-owned beauty supply stores at
9,000).
138 John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1485,
1493 (2012) (emphasis omitted). Professor Kirkwood distinguishes buyer power from
monopsony power, “the power of a purchaser to profitably reduce the price of an input below
the competitive level.” Id.
139 Id. at 1493-94.
140 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Daniel
A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31, 45 (2014)
(“The most commonly repeated maxim—that proof of restricted output and supracompetitive
prices establishes market power—is not an analytical criterion at all but merely repeats the
definition of market power.”).
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shares will generate still more questions about demand elasticity as well as
interchangeability with substitute products. 141 These, in turn, illuminate social
concepts such as intraracial solidarity and the pressures to conform to straight
hair. 142
This discussion has unfolded over the market power of consumers—or, more
accurately, consumer buying power. It is a discussion that the boycotts caselaw
invites. 143 Yet the literature on buyer power tends to assess the power of
monopsonies, such as resellers and employers. 144 Monopsonies, of course, are
not consumers, which is why monopsonies might nevertheless be reviled even
if in theory they depress prices. 145 Nonetheless, the market power inquiry forces
us to confront whether we should incorporate the insights of buyer power.
C.

What Do Offsetting Efficiencies Look Like?

If rule of reason were the proper standard for evaluating expressive
boycotts, 146 additional questions would ensue. For one, what might efficiencies
look like? Offsetting efficiencies can insulate certain anticompetitive schemes
from antitrust liability. 147 In the wigs and extensions market, efficiencies would
include the ease of communication between coracial consumers and retailers,
the ability of coracial manufacturers and retailers to anticipate beauty trends, and
the speed of distributing innovations in hair products to consumers.
Models do exist for efficient buyer-seller transactions through coethnic
vertical integration. Ethnic entrepreneurs have been able to squeeze efficiencies
out of transacting with only in-group counterparties. 148 Of course, this is
141

On the unreliability of market definition, see Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define
Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010); Sean P. Sullivan, Modular Market Definition, 55
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premised on assumptions that intraracial business transactions proceed smoothly
because of shared cultural and social language, custom, and values—as well as
the possibility that informal enforcement mechanisms rooted in the community
will hold counterparties to their deals. 149
As a corollary, another consequence of coethnic vertical integration is
exclusion of out-group competitors. This exclusion is where antitrust claims
germinate.
Ostensibly, efficiencies should enhance consumer welfare. 150 In
monopsonized markets, harms to consumer welfare through long-term reduction
in output make monopsonies and buyer cartels unpalatable even if they decrease
price in the short term. 151 But consumers are not monopsonies, and buying from
Black-owned hair stores may well accord with consumer preferences—even if
prices are comparable to, or perhaps higher than, Korean American–owned
stores. This preference, in turn, hearkens to the debate over whether antitrust
accounts for noneconomic goals.
D.

Should the Producer and Consumer Sides Be Assessed with Parity?

ESM markets raise questions of parity between the producer and consumer
sides of the market. Because each side is ethnically homogenous but misaligned,
it would seem that the antitrust analysis that unfolds for consumers should mirror
the process for producers. Thus, if a large number of small, Korean American–
owned firms collectively exert market power as sellers, 152 a large number of
individual African American consumers might do the same as buyers. 153
However, must a court strike a consumer boycott in this market under group
boycott law as easily as it finds a violation at the producer end if Korean
American–owned hair stores resort to collusion, exclusion, and information
exchanges to maintain dominance?
As a matter of doctrine, disparity in treatment of producers versus consumers
might be justified. Expressive boycotts, after all, enjoy First Amendment
protections. 154 As a theoretical matter, this balance between consumers and
producers is entangled with the inequality between African Americans and
149
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Korean Americans, an ethnicity in the racialized category of Asian Americans.
Whether through the lens of collusion and exclusion at the producer end or the
lens of expressive boycotts at the consumer end, a court may be called at some
point to settle a controversy in this market. The essence of such a controversy is
that two peoples of color are pitted against one another, each with their unique
histories of marginalization and subjugation.
CONCLUSION
The market for wigs and hair extensions upends several conventions in
antitrust doctrine while provoking theoretical quandaries. A hypothetical
boycott in this ESM market would force the antitrust caselaw on expressive
boycotts, currently splintered into two lines, to settle how to dispose of boycotts
motivated by social and economic goals. Meanwhile, such a boycott would push
the boundaries of market power and cartel theory, if power can be attributed to
millions of African American consumers.
A finding of buyer power in this market rests on intraracial solidarity, but
racial formation is a dynamic process. Solidarity among consumers cannot be
presumed—nor can demand inelasticity for wigs and extensions. These
complications undercut buyer power, but they also suggest that consumers and
producers are not locked forever in antagonism reinforced by intraracial and
intraethnic cohesion.
Given the ambivalence from the theoretical explorations of the wigs and
extensions market, it is perhaps premature to push the doctrine on expressive
boycotts in any direction. Ultimately, though, antitrust reduces relationships to
competition; in this view, either consumers or producers must prevail. Theory
and doctrine on racially collusive boycotts might remain unsettled for now, but
research must continue to strive for a resolution. This market is changing too
quickly for the law not to keep up.

